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This paper brings a long-term perspective to the debate on the causes of worktime differences 
among OECD countries. Exploiting new data sets on hours of work per week, days at work per 
year, and annual work hours between 1870 and 2000, we challenge the conventional view that 
Europeans began to labor fewer hours than Americans only in the 1980s. Like Australians and 
Canadians, Americans tended to work longer hours, after controlling for income, beginning 
around 1900. Labor power and inequality, which are held to be important determinants of 
worktime after 1970, had comparable effects in the period before 1913. To explain the 
longstanding predisposition of the New World to give more labor time, we examine the effects of 
three initial factors in 1870, culture, human capital, and geography on hours of work in 2000. We 
find that geography – the low population density of the New World that has led to shorter 
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The bottom line indicates that, given similar incentives, people make similar choices about labor and 
leisure. Free European workers from their tax bondage and you will see an increase in gross domestic 
product (oh, and you might see a pretty significant increase in gross national happiness, too). The same 
holds true for Americans.  
 
Edward C. Prescott, The Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2004. 
 
 
The crude Chicago of those days [the 1920s] was described by an English visitor as a string of industrial 
villages from factory to factory. 
 






The ever growing divide between leisure-bent continental Europe and much of the rest of the 
world has become something of a vexed concern to economists and political scientists. 
Explanations of recent worktime differences across OECD countries are as numerous as they are 
diverse. Bell and Freeman (1995, 2001) attributed the trend toward longer hours in the U.S. to 
rising inequality; Prescott (2004) claimed that higher taxes in the Old World have reduced the 
incentive to supply labor time; Burgoon and Baxandall (2004) considered that worktimes in the 
U.S. and Europe represented the preferences of liberal, social democratic, and Christian 
democratic regimes; and finally, Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) ascribed the bulk of the 
difference in worktime between the U.S. and Europe to differences in labor regulation and 
unionization rates.
1 Although their points of departure differ, these views share the claim that 
divergences are recent in origin. Freeman and Bell (2001, p. 104) are explicit. “The gap [U.S. vs 
Germany] is not a longstanding historical pattern.” In their view, Americans began working 
longer than Germans sometime between the 1970s and the early 1980s. Similarly, Prescott (2004, 
p.1) wrote: “Americans now work 50 percent more than do the Germans, French, and Italians. 
This was not the case in the early 1970s.”   
  The attention to current developments has its shortcomings. Using contemporary data it is 
difficult to disentangle the separate influences of incentives, institutions, and policy, and to 
separate these factors from cultural and other fixed factors. Consider Bell and Freeman’s 
incentive-based argument that those who work longer move up in the wage distribution, and the 
gains for doing so are greater the more unequal the wage distribution.
2 This outcome may well be 
a response to the local institutional environment – the porous safety net – or the result of weaker 
unionization rates in the U.S. that underlie wage inequality (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996). 
These forces may in turn be a product of a deeper longstanding work ethic or the basic drive to 
emulate some better off reference group (Bowles and Park 2004). There is no simple way to 
                                                 
1 For other explanations, see Gordon (2004); Freeman and Schettkat (2005).  
2 More precisely, Bell and Freeman argue that those who work longer move up in the wage distribution at the 
workplace, and the gains for working hard are greater the more unequal the wage distribution.    3
disentangle these explanations, and while certain econometric specifications control for some of 
these factors, the pitfalls of omitted and endogenous variables persist.  
  Historical studies do not suffer from some of these problems to the same extent. At the end 
of the nineteenth century, labor markets were relatively free from legislative interference and 
unions were relatively weak. These early, unfettered episodes thus provide a reference point to 
separate the role of institutions from other factors that may have affected work patterns (Fishback 
1998). This is the approach taken in this paper. We ask whether the recent trend toward relatively 
long work hours in the United States, as well as in Australia and Canada – the New World – has 
historic precedents.
3 We answer in the affirmative. At comparable levels of income – well before 
modern tax structures, welfare states, high degrees of unionization, and the like – the New World 
labored longer hours than elsewhere. Contrary to the view espoused by Prescott cited earlier, the 
current institutional environment was as much a response to as a cause of worktime patterns. 
There are deeper, more fundamental reasons why New World workers toil longer than 
Europeans. Specifically, we isolate the role of initial factor endowments, the intersection of 
geography and economics, to explain work patterns today.   
  Our argument proceeds in three stages. First, we introduce three new data sets on work 
hours per week, workdays per year, and annual work hours for a sample of New and Old World 
countries from 1870 to 2000. The historical record reveals two long-term tendencies that need to 
be explained. First, from 1870 Europeans had fewer days at work than their colonial offshoots; 
second, from an early date the decline in worktimes was consistently greater in the Old World. 
Still, Europeans did have longer total (annual) hours, but the gap across continents had narrowed 
substantially before 1913. The interwar years, in the wake of the depression, saw different 
political experiments with regard to the length of the workweek; France and the U.S. had the 
shortest work year in our sample of countries. These were exceptional years, however. Historical 
trends reasserted themselves after the war. A New World employee had fewer days off than a 
European, and the decline in worktimes was greater in the Old World. In the 1980s, the Old 
World began to work fewer total hours, but in historical perspective this reversal was the 
culmination of a long-term process. Compared to workers elsewhere, Europeans had a stronger 
preference for leisure beginning in 1870. This trends clearly emerges after controlling for levels 
of income. Even at early stages of development New World workers had a predisposition to 
supply more labor time.  
  In the second stage of the paper, we evaluate the determinants of changes in worktime in 
the periods before 1913 and after 1950. In our baseline model, the estimated coefficients of a 
regression of hours on wages are roughly similar across the two periods. These results are robust 
after controlling for demographic, economic, and social variables. We also consider whether 
inequality in the early period had the same effect that Bell and Freeman found for the U.S. and 
Germany today. Again, there are historical precedents. Inequality in the New World led to longer 
hours. We consider as well Alessina et al.’s hypothesis on unionization rates. For the period after 
1950 we are able to replicate their findings, but we find that labor power, proxied by the 
percentage of the male population eligible to vote, reduced working hours in Europe before 1913 
as well. The upshot is that the basic determinants of worktime changes in 1900 were no different 
than those one hundred years later.  
  The third stage of the paper speculates on the origins and the persistence of the New World 
choice to supply relatively more labor time. We investigate whether initial conditions in 1870, 
captured by geography (population density), human capital (school enrolment), and culture 
                                                 
3 Hours of work in New Zealand increased over the same period (OECD 2004).    4
(religion), can help to explain worktimes today. The underlying intuition is that worktime choices 
today are circumscribed by decisions taken at some earlier date.  
  Our findings suggest that geography trumped culture and human capital. Cross-country 
differences in worktimes today are related to the ability of Americans, as well Canadians and 
Australians, to have gotten to work more rapidly sometime in the past. As ever, Saul Bellow’s 
characterization of Chicago during the 1920s, cited above, seems to ring true for the New World. 
Located closer to their place of employment, North Americans and Australians supplied more 
labor time because of lower travel costs. For similar reasons – for a given workweek – they also 
preferred shorter days as opposed to fewer days of work. This pattern was visible by 1900.
  The variety of unemployment insurance schemes among our sample of countries illustrates 
how initial labor market outcomes became institutionalized. It was common practice for 
European workers, who had a strong preference for days off, to workshare during recessions. 
Accounting for this feature, short-time workers were eligible for unemployment insurance when 
the early legislation was introduced on the continent. In Australia, Canada, and the U.S., where a 
full-week of work was the norm, worksharing was less common – except for a brief period in 
U.S. history in the mid 1930s. As a result, short-time workers were excluded from UI benefits in 
the New World. Once in place, UI rules reinforced initial predispositions toward work. In this 
light, the longer worktimes in the New World in 2000 can indeed be situated on trajectory set 
sometime in the past.  
 
Worktimes from 1870 to 2000: The basic data 
  
  This section introduces the stylized facts of worktimes from 1870 to 2000. We study three 
components or dimensions of worktime: work hours per week (or per day), days of work per year 
(or weeks of work), and annual work hours. This breakdown is essential to our explanation of 
international differences, because how workers allocate their labor time may shed light on long-
run trends in worktime. Annual hours can mask these differences.  Owing to varying fixed costs 
in labor-market participation, workers may not be indifferent between different combinations of 
days of work and hours per day (or per week); there may be significant differences along these 
lines between men and women. The sources of change along the dimensions of labor supply have 
also varied across countries and regions. Unions have often taken the lead in fighting for a shorter 
workday; while governments have often taken the initiative to mandate vacation days.
4  
 
Hours of work per week 
  
  Table 1 presents an overview of the length of the workweek from 1870 for a sample of 
New and Old World countries. The unit of measurement is weekly hours of the average full-time 
worker (male and female) in non-agricultural activities.
5 These values control for days of work.
6 
                                                 
4 Hamermesh (1996, p. 14) made this point. Because workdays and work hours are different dimensions of the labor 
supply decision, “the existence of fixed costs along a particular dimension [days vs length of the work week]…can 
produce the unusual result of large jumps in labor supply along that dimension when the worker’s wage rate 
changes.” 
5 There was little part-time work in the period before 1913 and the interwar years. After 1945, the contribution of 
part-time workers to changes in the average length of the workweek varied considerably by county. It was most 
evident in the Netherlands and the U.K. (OECD 1998, 2004). That said, for most countries, recorded average hours 
of full-time and part-time workers moved together. As for women’s hours, these tended to be close to those of men   5
Our estimates until 1913 are from a firm-level survey assembled by the U.S. Department of 
Labor in 1900. Huberman (2004) describes the sample and weights used in calculating national 
averages from sectoral figures. For 1929 to 2000, we have taken estimates from the International 
Labour Organization, except where indicated otherwise.
7 For 2000, the table reports male and 
female work hours.
 By 2000, both European men and women worked less than their counterparts 
elsewhere.
8  
  Notwithstanding recent changes in the composition of labor supply and the rise of part-time 
work, the long-term pattern is clear (see Figure 1). In 1870, New World countries had a shorter 
workweek (or fewer hours per day) than elsewhere, but the rate of change in hours was nearly 
twice as great in the Old World. There were adjustments as well across sectors (Huberman 2004). 
Services had initially longer hours than manufacturing, a gap that widened in certain countries 
from 1870 to 1913; across countries, iron and steel had the shortest hours in this period. By the 
1920s national and sectoral worktimes had converged. 
  In order to explain the trend toward convergence, the literature has pointed to political and 
social changes before and after World War One. At the national level, the spread of universal 
suffrage and rising unionization rates in Europe exerted pressure on governments to reduce 
worktime. In the New Word, suffrage rates, which were greater in 1870, remained relative 
constant. Moreover, the New World entrusted legislation to the provinces or states, and 
decentralization may have slowed the movement to a national standard. The comparison between 
Belgium and Canada is instructive. In the former, the adoption of universal male suffrage in 1893 
triggered a series of legislative reforms that curtailed the workweek (Vandervelde 1911, 1920); 
but even in the most progressive province in Canada, Ontario, the few statutory interventions had 
modest effect.
9 In the New World, reductions in work hours appear to have been the “outcome of 
bargains struck between workers and employers, in the context of a competitive labor market  
(Margo 2000, p. 232).” After the war, the foundation of the ILO in 1919 and its sponsorship of a 
common standard, the eight-hour workday, gave added presence to the forces of convergence 
(Cross 1988). 
  Despite these political forces, the period of convergence was shortlived. The U.S. and the 
U.K. failed to ratify the eight-hour resolution adopted by the ILO, and by the mid 1920s certain 
national authorities, like Switzerland and Belgium, had loosened their commitments to the common 
standard. In the wake of the depression most countries seem to have gone their own way. Some, 
like France, opted for large cuts in worktime in the 1930s. The U.S. was a close second. Historians 
have traced these divergent trends to the various public and private strategies put in place to meet 
the rising demand for leisure from those employed and the demand for worksharing from the 
unemployed (Cross 1988). In France, the state legislated reduction in hours; in the U.S., 
                                                                                                                                                              
in the early years. The divergence between men’s and women’s work hours in some countries became more evident 
with rise in female labor force participation in the 1960s. See footnote 8.  
6 In this paper hours per week and per day are interchangeable. We prefer hours per week because this was the 
common metthod to record worktime. Hours per work per day can be inferred from Table 1. We assume full-time 
work consisted of six days from 1870 to 1913; five and a half from 1929 to 1950; and five from 1960 to 2000. 
Undoubtedly there were differences between countries, but there were also important sectoral variation that makes 
delineating distinct national patterns difficult.    
7 Until 1980, the data are from the ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics; after 1980, they are from ‘labor-related 
establishment surveys’ available from the ILO database LABORSTA. 
8 Since the 1980s, hours per week of women in Australia (Campbell 2005), Canada (Heisz and LaRochelle-Côté 
2003), and the U.S (Rones, Ilg, and Gardner 1997) have tended to approach that of men. In some European countries, 
large differences between genders persist (Freeman and Schettkat 2005, p. 11, footnote 6).  
9 On the weak enforcement of hours legislation in the U.S., see Goldin (1988).    6
Washington used its powers of moral suasion to encourage worksharing. Australia and Canada 
provide an example of the third way: job sharing and hour cutbacks were relatively unimportant 
(Gregory, Ho, and McDermott 1988; Green and MacKinnon 1988). We give a more extensive 
description of worksharing in the last section of this paper. 
  In the aftermath of World War II, old patterns reasserted themselves. New World workers 
tended to labor shorter weeks than their Old World colleagues, but as before 1913 the rate of 
change was greater in Europe. It was sometime between 1980 and 1990 that Europeans on 
average began to work fewer hours per week than elsewhere – but this was essentially the 
culmination of a century long trend.  
 
Days of work 
 
  Table 2 gives the number of days of work (vacations and national holidays) over the long 
twentieth century. We have taken values for 1870 and 1900 from Huberman (2004); those for 
1938 to 1990 from a series of contemporary studies of vacation days conducted by the ILO 
(1939, 1995), the U.S. Department of Labor (Monthly Labor Review 1955) and EIRO (1982); 
values for 2000 are from a variety of sources, including EIRO, the OECD, and official websites.
10   
  At the outset, days off were rooted in the traditional religious and social calendar and there 
was much sharing of work patterns across the Atlantic.
11 North American workers observed the 
Old World ritual of Saint Monday (Gutman 1973), while Europe adopted May Day, a U.S. 
creation. But by 1900 a clear pattern had emerged. In Catholic Europe many of the religious 
festivals had been transformed into secular holidays (Strikwerda 1997), and, although in certain 
Northern Europe countries the work year was long, the Old World had on average more than 
twice the number of days off as in the New.
12 Until 1913 paid holidays and vacations were rare. 
  From the end of hostilities until the 1930s, the change in the number of days off was greater 
in the New World – not surprising given their initial low level – but absolute increases were 
about the same in the two regions. The transformation of religious festivals into secular days had 
run its course, explaining to some extent the catch-up of the New World. In these years, European 
states and employers found themselves under growing pressure to convert days off into paid 
vacation days (Furlogh 1998). These programs were not initiated or restricted to France of the 
Front Populaire as commonly held. The Soviet Union and eastern European countries were the 
first to introduce paid vacations, and faced by growing labor power most western and northern 
European states emulated their programs (ILO 1939). 
  In North America legislation was not forthcoming and the story unfolded differently. Those 
employers who had instituted paid vacations as a part of a larger plan to win over workers from 
unions in the 1920s appear to have dropped them in the 1930s. Some of these firms replaced 
                                                 
10 There has been little change in vacation days in our sample of countries since 1990. There are discrepancies 
between thee figures in Table 2  and those reported elsewhere, owing to different measures used by the ILO, EIRO, 
and the OECD. Alesina et al. (2005) report a similar problem with the French data.  
11 The New World was in the forefront of many innovative programs to reduce the work year. French and Belgian 
workers viewed admiringly the handful of U.S. firms that had introduced paid vacations before WWI, and were 
envious of American workers’ tenacity in fighting for an eight-hour day (Hunnicut 1998). Australia was in fact the 
first country to institute this type of legislation on a broad scale (Coghlan 1918). Before World War II, continental 
social reformers considered the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as a model piece of legislation.  
12 Social historians confirm that that were fewer days off in the New than in the Old World. Rosenzweig (1983) 
found that American workers had only three official days off around 1870; Labor Day was the only additional 
holiday granted before 1913. (Although promoted by Abraham Lincoln to commemorate the Civil War, it was only 
in 1941 that the US congress proclaimed Thanksgiving a federal holiday.)    7
longer holidays with four-day weeks, but workers rejected these types of programs, preferring the 
customary five and a half days of work.
13 In a contemporary study, the U.S. National Industrial 
Conference Board found that more than half of the 300 establishments surveyed had either 
suspended or discontinued their paid vacation plans after the depression.
14 All told, the average 
North American production worker had about one-week paid vacation in the 1930s, about half 
that of a European worker, and considerably fewer public holidays.  
  After 1945, the historical pattern persisted. Again the absolute change was the same in the 
two regions. In Europe, legislation mandated further increases in paid vacation time, and, while 
Canadian workers were able to negotiate similar benefits, in the U.S. and Australia there is still 
no statutory minimum paid leave (Alesina et al., 2005, p. 6).  
  One would be hardpressed to say that the European preference for more days off is a recent 
phenomenon. This choice appears to have been fixed at early date. Although the decline in days 
worked was slow, about two days per decade over the twentieth century, the cumulative effect 
was large. By 2000, using figures for days of work from Table 2, the greater number of vacation 
days in Germany compared to the U.S. explains 45 percent of the gap in annual worktimes 
between the two countries.
15 
  Underlying this pattern was the longstanding difference in the allocation of worktime – 
given a fixed number of hours per week – between days at work and hours per day in the two 
regions. Europeans have had a time-honored preference for longer hours of work per day and 
fewer days. In the New World, the obverse held.
16 Although we postpone a full discussion of this 
paper pattern to later in the paper, we take note that, from an early date, workers and firms around 
the world had made divergent choices along the different dimensions of labor supply. Since these 
choices have persisted, understanding their origins may help to explain current worktime trends 
across countries.   
 
Annual hours of work 
 
  Table 3 presents annual work hours for our sample of countries from 1870 until today. The 
figures for 1870 to 1913 are from Huberman (2004) who constructed annual measures of full-
time production workers from estimates of the number of weeks worked (adjusted for days 
absent) and hours per week. The interwar observations have been calculated from Tables 1 and 2 
using the same method. The figures for both these periods are consistent with other estimates.
17 
From 1950 on, we have taken the series available from the University of Groningen database 
                                                 
13 More popular during the depression were worksharing programs that entailed a reduction in the length of shifts as 
opposed to fewer days of work. See Nemirow (1984, p. 35). 
14 This study was summarized in the Canadian Labour Gazette (September 1935, vol. XXXV, p. 743). 
15 About 5 percent of the gap between the two countries is explained by the shorter workweek; the remainder is 
explained by differences in labor force participation. Bell and Freeman (2001), Freeman and Shekttat (2005), and 
Alesina et al. (2005) produce a similar result.  
16 Goldin (1988) reported a similar tradeoff within the U.S. Women in manufacturing employment worked fewer 
days in states having longer hours per day. Women workers, who lived in the new suburbs often traveled far to their 
place of employment - men, on the other hand had shorter commutes - and this may explain the tradeoff they made 
(Harris and Lewis 2001, pp. 277-78). We explore the implications of commuting times in more detail later in the 
paper.  
17 Our figures for these years are consistent with other estimates. Matthews et al. (1982) reported 2,219 hours for 
Britain in 1924; Marchand and Thélot (1991), 2,287 hours for France in 1929; Maddison (2001), 2,342 hours for the 
U.S. in 1929.   8
(2005).
18 These figures are estimates of total work hours divided by the number of workers. The 
splice of datasets is appropriate because of the increase in women’s labor force participation (and 
the fact that full-time women work a shorter week then men) and the rise of part-time work in the 
second half of the century.
19 
  The New World labored fewer work hours than the Old for one hundred years. However, 
the average annual rate of change was greater in Europe (0.53 percent per annum) than in the 
New World (0.36 percent). The gap moved in favor of the Old World in the mid 1970s, and 
thereafter slowly widened (Figure 2). These results are not novel. Nonetheless, the long-run 
perspective is doubly revealing. First, it exposes the exceptional nature of the interwar years. The 
standard deviation of work hours (measured by the coefficient of variation) for the sample of 
countries is about the same in 1900 as in 2000, but the 1929 figure is half this value. This finding 
sheds light on debates about the impact of globalization on worker welfare. It is commonly held 
that in periods of deep international integration, like that before 1913 and after 1950, wages and 
employment conditions would have tended to converge. But hours of work in our sample show 
the opposite tendency. Evidently, globalization is consistent with different work patterns and 
conditions across countries.    
  Second, the long-run perspective exposes that, despite distinctive histories at the national 
level, New World countries today all work relatively long hours – they just achieved this 
outcome in different ways. The average U.S. worker spent the same numbers of hour on the job 
as a Belgian by 1913, even though the latter toiled almost 400 hours longer in 1870. The U.S. 
worker did see her hours cut dramatically in the interwar years, but resumed to longer work 
schedules after the war. Canadians actually toiled the longest in the interwar period, a degree of 
effort that persisted into the post 1945 years. The Australian pattern summarizes the histories of 
Old and New Worlds. In 1870, it had the shortest work year in the world, by the interwar years 
the duration of work was equal to our sample’s average, and by 2000 it had converged to levels 
found in Canada and the United States.    
  From the perspective of 130 years, the current divergence highlighted by Bell and Freeman 
(1995, 2001) and others does not look that spectacular. There were longstanding reasons that 
underlie the less rapid decline of worktimes in the New World. The mobility of workers within 
and across New World countries, a process that was tied to international flows, tilted workers’ 
collective decision against worktime cuts (Shiells 1990). Faced by the choice between wage 
increases that all workers relished and cuts in work hours that a smaller number desired, the 
collective decision in the New World favored greater earnings. In subsequent sections of the 
paper, we substantiate these claims.  
  Figure 3 makes the point of historical origins of international differences somewhat 
differently. We compare annual work hours at the same level of incomes for a sample of Old and 
New World countries. At extremely low levels of per capita income, less than $3,000, there was 
                                                 
18 These numbers are superior to other available estimates. Maddison’s (2001, p. 347) annual figures for 1990 show 
remarkably no difference between Germany and the U.S.; while the OECD (2001) reports a gap of 300 hours in 
favor of Germany. The Groningen figures fall in between these two. For a discussion, see van Ark and McGukin 
(1999).  
19 The figures after 1950 provide a check on the estimates for the early period. The difference in annual worktime for 
Denmark in 1950 using the same technique employed in constructing the 1870-1939 estimates and the corresponding 
figure from the Groningen database is 17 hours. This assumes 44.4 hr/wk in 1950 (Table 1) and 46.2 weeks of work 
(the value for 1938 calculated from Table 2). The method used for calculating annual hours in the earlier period is 
inappropriate for later years owing to changes in the composition of labor supply. Thus for Denmark in 2000, the 
difference using the technique for 1870-1939 and the Groningen estimate is 161 hours.   9
little difference across countries, but as incomes rose the gap in labor effort widened between the 
U.S. and Europe. At GDP per capita of $5,000, which the U.S. achieved in 1910 and France in 
1950, the annual work year of an American was 30 percent longer. Blanchard (2004) has 
performed a similar exercise for 2000, claiming that the lower level of work effort in France was 
compensated by rising productivity. This argument does not transfer across time. In 1900, output 
per hour was twice as great in the U.S. (Maddison 2001, p. 351). The question remains: Why 
does – and did – the New World work longer? 
 
Explaining work hours: Is there a common model? 
 
  In this section we compare the determinants of changes in worktime for two sub-periods, 
1870-1900 and 1970-2000. From a long-term perspective, the interwar years were exceptional; 
anyway the available data permit a detailed examination of the early and late periods only. For 
the early period, we have used information on wages and hours contained in the U.S. Department 
of Labor study previously referred to; for the later period, we have constructed a data set from 
surveys collected by the ILO. 
  Our research strategy is to estimate baseline models and then to ask whether the 
determinants of worktime varied over the two periods because of social, political, or demographic 
changes. Variables that are ‘fixed’, such as religion, are dealt with in a later section. If the 
coefficients remain roughly similar across the two periods, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
there was no major break in the determinants of worktime over the long twentieth century.  
 
Determinants of worktime: 1870-1900 
 
  Column 1 of Table 4 gives the baseline results for the first period with controls for 
countries, sex, occupation, and year.
20 For males, a 10 percent increase in the wage led to a 1 
percent decline in the workweek, about 35 minutes based on the figure for 1900 from Table 1. 
The estimated coefficient corresponds to other estimates.
21 Column 2 shows a similar, albeit, 
smaller coefficient for manufacturing only.
22 Column 3 adds a dummy variable for region to the 
baseline regression. Recall than in the previous section we found that initially Europeans had a 
longer workweek, but the decline in their worktimes was greater than that of workers in the 
western offshoots. The regression confirms this. The relative rise in wages in the Old World is 
driving this result. For a given wage change, New World workers were less predisposed to take 
more leisure. To begin to explain these differences across continents, in regression 4 we add 
indicators of the dependency ratio and proportion of workers in agriculture.
23 The signs of the 
estimated coefficients are what we would have expected. The larger the agricultural population 
                                                 
20 The data were classified into five occupations: services, manufacturing, textiles, mining and construction, and iron 
and steel. We have deflated wages (which the Department of Labor recorded by the day) using the price indexes 
cited by Williamson (1995).    
21 These are uncompensated labor supply elasticities and fall within the range of other estimates (see Pencavel 1986). 
The point of the exercise in this section is not to improve on previous estimates with new data, but simply to assess 
the stability of the estimated coefficients over time. See Costa (2000) for comparable U.S. estimates for the 1890s. 
22 Regressions of like those in Table 4 may perform poorly because of a built-in spurious correlation. Daily earnings 
are themselves constructed from information on weekly earnings and on hours per week (Costa 2000, p. 165). To 
check for this possibility, we regressed hours on lagged wages for the UK observations. Again the results do not 
change substantially. These regressions are available from the authors. 
23 The dependency ratio is defined as the number of males less than 16 years of age plus males over 65 plus all 
females divided by males between 16 and 65.   10
and the greater the dependency ratio, the longer the workweek. Despite these additions, however, 
the wage coefficients remain roughly stable.  
  Recent papers by Alesina et al. (2005) and by Burgoon and Baxandall (2004) make the 
strong case that reduced worktime in Europe after 1970 was associated with greater levels of 
unionization. For the period before 1913, union density was not a significant determinant of 
worktime, a not surprising result given the low levels of unionization.
24 That said, male suffrage 
rates are perhaps a better indicator of labor power in this period because an increase in the 
number of voters was often manifested in pro-labor legislation. Figure 4 graphs the positive 
relation between the change in voter turnout from 1870 to 1913 and the reduction in work hours 
per week (from Table 1) for the same year.
25 In many countries hours’ legislation was restricted 
to the years after 1900 which falls outside the period covered by the sample studied in Table 4. 
Nonetheless, for the subsample of Old World countries (there was little or no change in rates of 
suffrage in the New World between 1870 and 1900) the coefficient on voter turnout in column 6 
World has a coefficient of -.04, and is significant at the 15 percent level. To illustrate, the 
Netherlands had a lower voter turnout than France in 1880 (20 vs 65 percent). If it had the same 
turnout as in the hexagon, weekly hours would have fallen by about two hours.
26  
Table 5 examines the country patterns in more detail, with controls for occupation and sex. 
Although the results are sensitive to sample size, some national characteristics that continue to 
persist into the late twentieth century reveal themselves. For a given wage increase, the Danes 
and Germans were willing to take more leisure than Americans. Still, the latter gave labor less 
time than Canadians and Australians, who in turn, compared to the British, Belgians, and 
Spaniards, preferred the opportunities of wage work. 
  How sensitive was labor supplied before 1913 to inequality? Recall that Bell and Freeman 
claimed that rising in inequality is behind the trend toward longer hours in the U.S. More 
precisely, those who work longer move up in the wage distribution at the workplace, and the 
gains for working hard are greater the more unequal the wage distribution. Although the 
underlying story may be different, inequality did lead to longer hours in the earlier period. Figure 
5 traces the positive relation between average annual changes in inequality, as measured by the 
O’Rourke-Williamson (1999, p. 176) index for 1870 to 1913, and reductions in the length of the 
workweek over the same period. Sweden and Denmark were well above average, exhibiting 
increased equality and large cuts in hours; the U.S. and Canada were below average.  
  The micro data we have collected data confirm this result. For each occupation in the 
sample, we calculated the difference between maximum and minimum wages for each year.
27 
Column 2 in Table 5 reports results of a regression of hours on inequality. In the U.S. and 
Canada, greater inequality led to longer hours, holding wage levels constant. In Belgium, 
Denmark, Great Britain, and Italy the opposite held, while in France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and Sweden there was no relation between inequality and hours. Although Australia and 
Switzerland were exceptions, the dynamics seem to be different between regions.  
  These results suggest, however, that the causes of inequality were perhaps different before 
1913 than after 1970. The Bell and Freeman explanation of long hours after 1970 turns on 
                                                 
24 These regressions are available from the authors.  
25 Sources for voter turnout are Flora (1983) and Lindert (2004). The correlation coefficient of the relation in Figure 
4 is 0.38. Italy is excluded from the figure. It had a large rise in voter turnout, but no change in work hours.  
26 Using decadal values for both Old and New World between 1870 and 1913 from Table 3, we regressed annual 
hours on GDP per capita, the share of the population in agriculture, country dummies, and voter turnout. In this 
specification, the coefficient of voter turnout was negative and significant at the 0.05 level.  
27 This indicator is close to the Theil index of interindustry wage inequality.   11
incentives within the firm. Our findings are not restricted to sectors in which large firms 
dominated. At least for North America, Bowles and Park ‘s (2004) model of social emulation, or 
Veblen effects – the desire of workers across occupations to imitate a richer reference group – 
provides a better fit for the early period. The economic history literature makes this point 
differently. In the New World, workers were relatively scarce and their mobility was great 
(Fishback 1998; Long and Ferrie 2005). Inequality, Pope (2000, p. 139) wrote, is endemic in 
fluid and dynamic economies like that of the late nineteenth century U.S, where new participants 
entered relocated, changed occupations, and took “ risks to capture the opportunities before 
them.” The results from our sample are consistent with this story. Across occupations, skilled 
workers in the U.S. and Canada would not forsake the opportunity of long hours.  
 
Determinants of worktime: 1970-2000 
 
For this period, we used evidence collected by the ILO from 1970 on full-time weekly 
hours and wages (per hour) by sector of activity.
28 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 present the 
baseline estimates with controls for sex, countries, sector, and year. For a larger group of 
heterogeneous industries, the coefficient is positive but close to zero. For a subset of comparable 
sectors the absolute size of the coefficient on wages is smaller than in the earlier period, but 
because the level of aggregation of the underlying data differs across the two samples, it would 
be premature to conclude that there is any substantial differences across periods. A similar result 
holds for manufacturing only in regression 3. In this period, the New World dummy is not 
significant, a result perhaps of the sectors included in our sample. That said, the difference in the 
duration of the workweek between regions was not as great in this period as the difference in the 
number of days worked and annual hours. Column 5 adds control variables for population 
structure and the percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture. Again, the addition of these 
variables alters only modestly the wage coefficient. Column 6 adds unionization rates. Labor 
power, as in the period before 1913, has succeeded in cutting the length of the workweek, a 
finding consistent with Alesina et al. (2005) and Burgoon and Baxandall (2004).  
Table 7 examines country patterns in more detail for the late twentieth century. We 
restrict ourselves to those countries for which we were able to separate male and female workers, 
although the results for men are most directly comparable with those in Table 5. The estimated 
coefficients (controlling for sector) for men are more variable than in the first period, but they fall 
within the range of other modern studies of labor supply. For some countries, like Belgium, 
Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland, the results are pretty much identical with those for the first 
period. The coefficient for Australia changes signs, but the absolute difference is not great. For 
Canada and the U.S., most recent studies report uncompensated wage elasticities of 0.0 to -0.7 for 
men, pretty much what we have found for the early period (Pencavel 1986).                                                            
The regression results of Tables 4-7 suggest that there has been no dramatic                                                
change in the determinants of hours of work over 130 years. The wage coefficient has been 
relatively stable, and labor power and inequality have continuously exerted pressure on hours and 
in opposite directions. The persistence of these fundamental relationships is found in Table 8, 
where a model of nineteenth century hours is used to predict weekly work hours between 1970 
and 1990. Two stripped-down versions of the model in Table 4 are considered. In the first, hours 
                                                 
28 The sectors included were: construction, finance, manufacturing, sales, mining, service, transport, and 
utilities. Because the coverage of male and female workers was uneven across sectors, countries, and time, in some 
cases we use a smaller sample of  ‘comparable industries’ consisting of construction, manufacturing, and mining.    12
between 1870 and 1900 were regressed against log wages and a dummy for sex; the second 
model adds the dependency ratio and the proportion of the population in agriculture. The 
coefficients from this regression are then combined with actual average values for the same set of 
variables from the Old and New Worlds between 1970 and 1990 to predict hours in recent 
decades. The predicted values are within ten percent of actual weekly hours in each decade, and 
the model does predict rising relative (weekly) worktime in the New World. Model 1 predicts a 
gap of 30 minutes less than the actual difference in 1980. These results do not sit well with the 
view that sometime after 1970 a new regime of international worktimes emerged in which 
Americans began to toil longer than Europeans.  
In all, the standard model identifies satisfactorily the causes of changes in hours worked 
over the long run. It does not explain entirely, however, the initial differences in levels of work 
times in the New and Old Worlds as illustrated in Figure 2. The puzzle remains. Why did and do 
North Americans and Australians work longer? 
 
Deep variables and working hours 
 
  The labor supply decision melds short and long-run considerations. In the preceding 
section we have concentrated on determinants, like labor power and inequality, that exhibit a 
considerable degree of variability across time, the relative importance of which has been the 
subject of much of the recent literature on worktime differences since 1950. But the labor market 
decision is conditioned by deep-seated variables that are not only economic, but social and 
geographic in origin as well. These variables may have their origin well before 1950. In this 
section, we contend that the gap between Old and New World hours today is as much a response 
to short-run as to these long-run factors. We focus on three initial factors that may have had 
irreversible effects, at least to varying degrees, on the different dimensions of worktime: culture, 
human capital, and geography.
29 
 
Culture Landes (1999, p. 175) has renewed the debate on the relation between religion and the 
work ethic. The Puritan mantra of the seventeenth century, ‘Time is short and the work is long,’ 
summarizes well his argument. “Puritans,” other historians (Rodgers 1978, p. 9) observed, “threw 
out the “irregular carnival of saints’ days, and replac[ed] it with the clocklike rhythm of the 
weekly Sabbath.” Undoubtedly, as Rodgers (1978, p. 11) has written, the work ethic of the 
nineteenth century did not have the theological trappings of its earlier versions; but “the ascetic 
injunctions of the Protestant ethic [were] retained and multiplied their force.” Today, although the 
moral force has dissipated, the legacy of the work ethic remains. There are fewer public holidays 
in New World countries and for long periods of their histories governments were less inclined to 
place limits on labor supply. Over the long run, work hours have become a positional good 
(Frank 1985), the demand for which has increased because long hours on the job are seen to bring 
relative advantages not strictly related to income. In empirical work, these forces are difficult to 
identify. The correlation between the percentage of the population who were Protestant in 1870 
and worktime in 2000 (the same result holds if we consider the change in worktime from 1870 to 
2000) in Figure 6 is weak (r = -0.04).   
                                                 
29 Hall and Jones (1999) use an analogous concept, ‘social infrastructure’, in their study of long-term economic 
growth. Engerman and Sokoloff  (1997) relate how the interaction between geography and population density 
impacted on growth performance in the Americas.    13
 
Human Capital Kniesner (1976) proposed that U.S. work hours after 1950 stabilized because the 
average worker chose to acquire additional schooling. This effect is different than that associated 
with an increase in wages (and hours) caused by an exogenous increase in the demand for labor 
of a certain quality. Individuals who have increased their market earning power through further 
education are expressing their commitment to market work. This should lead us to expect that at a 
given wage rate individuals with greater schooling will probably work longer than others.
30 
Kneisner’s argument transfers across space and time. Countries with initially high levels of 
enrolment in the late nineteenth century would have put in place incentives that perpetuated the 
relation between schooling and work, perhaps along the lines suggested by Lucas (2002). These 
forces may have waned over the century, however. The common indicator of education levels 
one hundred years ago is primary school enrolment – the measure adopted in this paper – but as 
this level of education became uniform across our sample of countries, its explanatory power 
would have weakened.
31 Still, school enrolment in the New World was 50 percent greater than in 
the Old World in 1870, and 37 percent greater in 1913. Figure 7 shows that century-old 
enrolment levels did have a lasting effect on worktime. The coefficient of correlation between 
human capital in 1870 and annual hours today is 0.15. 
 
Geography In the textbook model of labor supply, the greater the fixed-time cost of taking on a 
job, the higher the reservation wage, and the fewer the hours supplied. The point is illustrated in 
Figure 8. Higher commuting costs shift the labor supply curve of the individual to the left. We 
also show that the reservation number of hours of work may rise when time costs rise. The result 
is twofold. The labor force has contracted and those who remain will work fewer hours.
32  
In Figure 8 the individual European’s labor supply curve in the late nineteenth century is 
represented by Low; the worker in the New World by Lnw.  At the same wage, the average Old 
World worker gives fewer hours.  
Urban historians frequently refer to the close proximity of workers in the New World to 
their place of employment.
33 Even in large cities like Montreal, many laborers resided in the same 
‘quartiers’ as their work sites (Lewis 2000).
34 European cities were simply older and land was 
scarce (Kaelble 1988).  Before 1913 Belgians commuted daily by rail transport, up to one and 
half hours (in one direction) in some cases, to their work sites (Mahaim 1910). When factories 
were established on in the city outskirts in Europe workers tended to live either in the city cores 
or in satellite towns some distance away; only managers could afford the new suburbs.  With 
suburbanization in the New World, both workers and managers moved to the greenfield sites 
                                                 
30 Put differently, the regressions reported in the previous section, which neglect the separate role of education, bias 
upward the estimated wage coefficients. 
31 Our schooling measure is primary-school students per 1000 children of ages 5-14. Source: Lindert (2004). 
32 The reduction in hours of work stems from the fact that the reduction in total usable time is shared between 
reductions in leisure and work. However, the net reduction of the supply of labor will cause wage rates to rise for the 
labor market as a whole. Of course, market wages in the New World were always above the reservation wage of the 
average Old World worker and we do not observe the lower portion of Lnw 
33 On the scope of the U.S. labor market, see Rosenbloom (2002). On Chicago, Melbourne, and Toronto, see 
Borchert (1996), Frost (2001), Harris (1998). Echoing Augie March, Harris and Lewis (2001, p. 272) wrote: “From 
an early date, immigrants and workers had followed industry away from the center [of Chicago]. The Stockyards 
from the 1860s, Pullman in the 1880s, and the Central and Clearing districts after 1900 are prominent examples. By 
1920, there was a close association between industry and working-class settlement.”  
34 The title of Monkkonnen’s (1984) volume on labor mobility in the U.S., “Walking to Work,” is apt.    14
outside the city center. Although they resided in different districts, both groups remained close to 
their places of employment.  
Social observers like Rowntree (1910), who were concerned about urban conditions at the 
turn of the century, described fully these distinctive regional patterns of commuting. In the 
interwar period, commuting became the focus of attention in ILO studies on the effects of the 
depression on participation and unemployment rates. One study which compared auto assembly 
plants in the Midlands and Michigan (Liepmann 1944, pp. 50-65) found that 25 percent of 
workers coming into Birmingham traveled between 6 and 10 km one way, and another 25 percent 
more than 10 km; in Flint, two-thirds of laborers traveled by car about 15 minutes to and from 
work – and returned the short distance home for lunch. Heim (2000) confirms these distances for 
the U.S. 
  The relative ease with which New World workers entered the labor market had long-term 
implications for the amount of effort they supplied, as well as the allocation between days of 
work and hours per day.
35 At the margin, Europeans preferred more days off, compared to 
Americans, because of longer commuting times. The ILO study concluded bluntly on the 
preference of Europeans for additional days off:  
 
The five-day week is a helpful device: it reduces by a full sixth the number of journeys and with it the 
cost, loss of time and strain involved. To minimise the employees’ travelling is one of the main 
considerations prompting firms to introduce the five-day week. The working hours lost through not 
opening on Saturday morning are usually added to the five remaining days.  
 
The upshot is that factor endowments affected total hours supplied as well as individual 
preferences for the scheduling of work – the two features we identified earlier that distinguished 
Old and New Worlds over the long run. In this paper we use country size, measured in sq. km, 
divided by population, and weighted by the proportion of country area that is habitable, as a 
indicator of population density.
36 Figure 9 illustrates a negative correlation (r=-0.79) between 
commuting times and this measure of area in 2000.
37 For the same year, longer commuting times 
were correlated (r=-0.52) with shorter annual hours. This relation has deep historical roots. Figure 
10 traces the strong positive relation (r=0.68) between area (and short commuting times) in 1870 
and annual work hours in 2000. This relation is positive (r = 0.12) for the subsample of European 
countries as well. Around the globe, low population density in 1870 seems to have had a 
persistent effect on worktimes. All this does not deny that contemporary Americans may now 
face longer journeys to work; indeed the rise in commuting times in the U.S. big cities has 
                                                 
35 Hammermesh (1996, p. 36) observed the historic trend in his recent study of U.S. and German worktimes: “[T]he 
relative flexibility of the American labor market compared to one European labor market, Germany, is manifested 
chiefly in greater dispersion of days worked, not daily hours.” 
36 Our indicator of habitable area is the percentage of urban extent in each country. These figures range from less 
than 0.5 percent for Australia to 41 percent in Belgium. The definition of urban area is a population unit of over 
2,500. Source Centre for International Earth Science Information Network:  
http://beta.sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/global.jsp#summary. 
37 Commuting-time estimates for 2000 are from:   





Commuting_Patterns_in_2000.htm   15
coincided with the advent of telecommuting in lieu of more days off in the 1990s (Hammermesh 
1998). But these are new developments that will prove difficult to redress a century old pattern of 
more days of work per year in the New World.  In the next section we illustrate how early 
unemployment insurance legislation codified these commuting practices, thereby impacting on 
labor market outcomes today. 
 
Estimating the contribution of deep variables 
  
Table 9 reports results of a series of regressions with annual data on work hours from 1950 
to 2000 and weekly hours from 1970-2000 as dependent variables.
38 As is customary with annual 
data, we use GDP per capita as an independent variable. Columns 2 and 3 confirm our previous 
finding that the New World is different than the Old World, and that labor power has brought 
down working times, even with the addition of unemployment rates. In the fourth and fifth 
regressions, we add the deep variables, with values for 1870. Geography and initial levels of 
human capital have had enduring effects on annual hours of work today, and in the anticipated 
direction. Religion, however, seems to have had, inexplicably, a negative effect. All together, 
comparing columns 4 and 3, the deep variables explain as much of the changes in worktime as do 
unionization and unemployment rates.  
Columns 6 to 8 exploit data on full-time weekly hours collected by the ILO (which underlie 
Tables 6 and 7) for 1970-2000. In this specification geography is significant, but has a negative 
effect on weekly hours. This result is expected. Recall that historically New World workers 
preferred shorter workdays (but more days) than Europeans. Note that religion and enrolment 
have changed signs in comparison with Columns 4 and 5. It is hard to distinguish whether these 
changes are due to the sectoral makeup of data set, or to a different and unknown, relationship 
between these deep variables and the length of the workweek. In any event, the impact of a 
change in area on worktimes is greater than that of the other deep variables.
39 We conclude that 
geography alone has had considerable importance on worktimes in 2000.  
 
Geography, Hours, and Institutions: The Case of Unemployment Insurance 
 
“Even if, later on, institutions may ultimately affect the evolution of factor endowments, the initial 
conditions with respect to factor endowment had long, lingering effects (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997, pp. 
275-76).” 
 
The variety of UI programs across countries illustrates how initial factor endowments had 
enduring effects on worktimes. In this section, we sketch, first, how eligibility requirements for 
UI programs in Old and New Worlds encoded different preferences for days of work, and, 
second, how once in place these rules reinforced initial predispositions toward worktime. 
  In the decades before the introduction of UI, Old and New World workers and firms 
responded to downturns in strikingly distinctive ways. In the New World, despite long periods of 
                                                 
38 Annual data are from the Groningen database (2005).  
39 From the estimates of regression 5 in Table 9, using the highest and lowest values of the independent variables for 
1870, we calculated the following: if Italy had the same proportion of Protestants as Sweden, its worktimes would 
have been 1.6 percent shorter; if Italy had the same enrolment levels as the U.S., its hours would have been 3.1 
percent longer; if Ireland had the same urban area per capita as Canada, its hours would have been 5.8 percent 
longer. Calculations available from authors.    16
downtime before 1913, worksharing was rarely resorted to.
40 In the 1930s, Washington had 
encouraged worksharing, but this was an exceptional episode and many of the programs that were 
instituted did not engender much enthusiasm anyway (Jacoby 1985). In Australia and Canada, job 
sharing and hour cutbacks were relatively unimportant in the depression (Gregory, Ho, and 
McDermott 1988; Green and MacKinnon 1988). Wherever possible, in good and bad times, 
workers sought out full-year contracts.
41 That said, there was much seasonal work in the New 
World. But Engerman and Goldin (1993) provide examples of workers moving between 
agriculture and manufacturing employment into the early twentieth century, a practice that was 
feasible because of the low transport and related fixed costs of going to work.
42 Although the 
process was imperfect and workers did face periods of unemployment, dovetailing provided the 
possibility of a long, if not interrupted work year, filling seasonal demands in the two sectors.
43 
The point here is that when manufacturing firms in the U.S. turned to full-time production in the 
1920s they had to offer workers full-time contracts – as opposed to part-time schedules or 
worksharing arrangements – because they had to compete for workers who had grown accustom 
to long work years.  
  In the Old World before the advent of formal UI schemes, worksharing was more 
widespread. Again geography mattered. In Belgium, there was a surplus of agricultural workers, 
and those workers who lived in the countryside and commuted to their places of employment in 
manufacturing, rarely found alternative work when laid off. Dovetailing, one authority (Rubinow 
1913, p. 444) on unemployment speculated, was less common in the Old World. Often, 
unemployment meant one or two days off per week (Vandervelde 1903), the burden of which 
was reduced for thosewho had considerable daily fixed costs of getting to work. This pattern 
persisted in the interwar years in Belgium (Goossens, Peeters, and Pepermans 1988) and 
elsewhere on the continent. The upshot is that in the period before UI was legislated, part-time 
work schedules, like worksharing, were prevalent throughout Europe – put in place to 
accommodate the lack of alternative employment, as well as workers’ preference for fewer days 
of work (Huberman 1997). 
Unemployment insurance legislation codified the different labor market histories of Old 
and New World countries. Social insurance legislation in Europe when it came to be written 
incorporated the widespread use of worksharing arrangements. The German case was 
unambiguous. Summarizing its 1927 UI Act, one historian (Weigart 1934, p. 34) wrote: “Part-
time employment is not penalized; instead it is encouraged.” Throughout Europe, short-time 
workers were eligible for benefits, a situation that persists until today. It was often the case that a 
minimum level of weekly earnings was required for eligibility. Contemporary Belgium, it should 
come as no surprise, has the most generous system on the continent with regard to eligibility and 
payments for short-timers (Abraham and Houseman 1993). 
                                                 
40 Atack, Bateman, and Margo (2002) reported that U.S. manufacturing consistently operated far below full-time 
work hours in this period. 
41 Goldin (1990, p. 182) observed that part-time work in the U.S. before World War II was practically 
“unobtainable.”  
42 Home ownership was higher in the New World, but this did not constrain mobility (Monkonnen 1988, p. 197). 
43 Seasonal unemployment in the U.S. became more of concern in the 1920s when manufacturing turned toward full-
time schedules, reducing dovetailing and thereby explaining the concerns of architects of UI legislation for this type 
of unemployment. See below.   17
In Canada and the U.S., early UI legislation excluded part-time workers, again an outcome 
that persists across many states today.
44 The Canadian legislation was based on a model worker 
who gave 180 days of work in the year, with the assumption of a six-day workweek.
45 In the 
U.S., from the outset short-time compensation payments out of state UI trust funds ran counter to 
the federal standard in the original law (Title IX of the 1935 Social Security Act).
46 The contrast 
between Old and New Worlds was not simply another example of munificent and flexible Europe 
versus miserly and strict North America; rather it represented the outcome of the deep-rooted 
preferences toward worktime we identified earlier. The average worker in the New World could 
meet the qualifying conditions because of the predisposition to work more days per year than the 
representative European whose preference was to give longer hours per day. 
Thus UI legislation responded to initial factor endowments and workers’ preferences in 
Old and New Worlds. But the relation between institutions and preferences was mutually 
reinforcing. Consider the experiences in Germany and Canada with worksharing in the 1980s and 
early 1990s.
47 On the one hand, German workers have long been accustomed to short-time work, 
partly because it was subsidized by UI, and they are open to the possibility of working less, even 
if this means lower wages. Canadian workers, on the other hand, have had little experience with 
short-time since for a long period it was not eligible under UI rules, and when offered the choice 
of a reduced work week, they have refused it. These histories came to play in the experiences of 
two large companies, Volkswagen and Bell Canada, which introduced worksharing programs to 
meet the downturn of the early 1990s. The former’s program was deemed a success; the latter’s 
was abandoned after less than one year. Canadian workers’ lack of enthusiasm for a shorter work 
schedules in the 1990s was not out of place given their age-old predisposition toward labor time, 




  Conclusion: History and Policy 
 
The debate on worktimes in OECD countries has tended to focus on the period after 1950, 
if not later. We believe that worktime differences can best be understood in a long-term 
perspective in which the separate effects of incentives and institutions and fixed factors can be 
                                                 
44 In their overview of the origins of the U.S. unemployment insurance program of 1935, Baicker, Goldin, and Katz 
(1998) provide another example how geography mattered. They argue that the ‘distinctive’ characteristic of the 
American system is experience or merit rating, by which firms’ contributions are based on the number of workers 
laid off. They attribute this feature to the prevalence of seasonal unemployment. That experience rating did not 
encourage more worksharing is counterintuitive. However, experience rating was never complete, because seasonal 
employers successfully lobbied to receive transfers from non-seasonal industries.    
45 There were important modifications in the Canadian UI system in the 1970s, but short-timers were integrated into 
the system only in the 1990s (Green and Riddell 1993). Australia’s system of unemployment benefits – it was not 
conceived as an insurance scheme – came into effect in 1944; until then the States had their own forms of social 
assistance. In Queensland a system of unemployment insurance was established in 1921. The system provided 
benefits based on days of work, and although it allowed casual laborers to contribute and receive partial benefits, the 
system was biased toward full-time workers. To qualify, a worker had to make contributions for six months in the 
year preceding the UI claim (Bland 1934). A British (Ince 1937, pp. 19-20) observer, comparing the U.K. and 
Queensland systems, wrote that in Australia the “desire [is] to put a premium on casual employment in place of 
regular employment… thus encouraging the substitution of casual workers for regular workers.” 
46 On this, see Blaustein (1993, p. 337); for the situation today, see Storey and Neiesner (1997). 
47 This paragraph summarizes Huberman (1997) 
48In 2000, part-time employment as a proportion of total employment in the U.S (13.3 percent) was lower than the 
average of the European Union (16.4 percent). Source: OECD (2004).    18
identified. To this end, we first have assembled new data series on various dimensions of 
worktime, and then offered an interpretation of the major trends. Our new ‘stylized facts’ of 
worktime are:  
                                           
• The history of hours of work in the U.S. was not exceptional. Its experience was shared by 
other New World countries. 
 
• From an early date the Old and New Worlds made different choices about the number of days 
at work and hours of work per week and per day. Since 1870, the Old World has had more days 
off and a faster decline in hours per week. 
 
• With regard to annual hours, the Old World began working shorter years than the New World 
sometime after 1970, but this reversal was by no means a sea change; rather it was the 
culmination of a long-term trend in Europe. Beginning in 1900 or so, the Old World worked less 
than the New after controlling for levels of income.  
 
Our interpretation of these basic facts is: 
 
• Labor power and inequality, factors that are deemed to be important determinants of worktime 
after 1970 or so, had comparable effects in the period before 1913. These factors help explain the 
greater change in worktime in the Old than in the New World throughout the period. But the gap 
in worktimes between the Old and New Worlds at comparable levels of income and from an early 
date still begs an explanation.  
 
• We speculate that factor endowments were one reason why the New World was inclined to give 
more labor time. Because of low population density, which went hand in hand with a high degree 
of mobility, New World workers were able to reside close to their place of employment. They 
gave more work, because it was less costly to do so. 
 
• Labor market outcomes in New and Old Worlds were codified in state regulations and 
workplace institutions. The integration of worktime schedules in UI programs is an example of 
this process.  
 
If history does matter, as the evidence would seem to suggest, then policy proposals to 
transform the Old World into the New, and vice versa, by changing tax schedules or consumption 
patterns in one direction or another, need to be reconsidered. It is problematic to claim that policy 
is transferable and will have similar effects everywhere. Because attitudes to worktime have 
diverged over a long period, we cannot be certain that workers of the world today are intrinsically 
alike and will respond similarly to the same incentives. Over time, nurture has come to dominate 
nature.    
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Hours of Work per Week, 1870-2000 
 
   1870  1880  1890  1900  1913  1929  1938  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000 (M) 2000 (F)
Belgium  72,2  69,3  66,5  64.2  59.5  48.2  48.0  42.5  39.9  38.5  36.6  37.3  36.5 
Denmark  69.9  64.6  59.9  56.0  55.8  48.5  47.6  46.0  44.4  39.0  37.5  35.0  39.3  37.7 
France  66.1  66.0  65.9  65.9  62.0  48.0  39.0  44.8  45.9  44.8  40.7  39.9  36.9  34.6 
Germany  67.6  66.3  65.1  64.0  57.0  46.0  48.5  48.2  45.6  43.8  41.6  39.0  40.8  39.0 
Ireland  63.8  62.0  60.2  58.6  56.4  46.6  48.2  45.0    42.7  41.1  42.1  40.7  38.0 
Italy  63.3  63.4  63.6  63.8  62.5  48.8  48.5  47.8  42.4  42.9  42.5  39.6  41.4  35.4 
Netherlands  65.0  63.4  61.9  60.5  58.6  48.1  48.5  49.2    45.1  40.8  34.0  37.6  30.1 
Spain  64.7  62.7  60.8  59.1  56.7  48.5  47.0      40.0  38.9  36.9  34.0 
Sweden  69.6  64.6  59.9  56.0  56.0  48.0  46.3  46.8  43.4    37.7  38.2  39.1  36.3 
Switzerland  65.4  63.1  60.9  59.0  56.3  48.5  46.3  47.5  46.1    43.8  41.6    
UK  56.9  56.6  56.3  56.0  56.0  47.0  48.6  45.7  44.7  42.0  40.0  42.4  42.0  38.9 
                  
Australia  56.2  53.3  50.5  48.1  44.7  45.5  45.0  39.6  39.6  39.6  39.2  40.1  42.6  38.5 
Canada  57.2  59.0  60.9  62.6  57.9  49.0  47.2  42.3  40.7  39.7  38.5  38.0  42.8  36.0 
US  62.0  61.0  60.0  59.1  58.3  48.0  37.3  42.4  40.2  38.8  39.1  39.7  43.3  37.2 
                  
Old World  65.9  63.8  61.9  60.3  57.9  47.8  47.0  46.8  44.4  42.5  40.4  38.7  39.2  36.1 
New World  58.5  57.8  57.1  56.6  53.6  47.5  43.2  41.4  40.2  39.4  38.9  39.4  42.9  37.2 
                  
World  64.3  62.5  60.9  59.5  57.0  47.8  46.1  45.4  43.2  41.7  40.1  38.9  40.1  36.3 
s.d  4.92  4.10  4.08  4.63  4.13  1.07  3.56  2.82  2.33  2.35  1.82  2.47  2.35  2.45 
 
Notes: Hours of work per week of full-time production workers.  
Sources: 1870-1913 – Huberman (2004); 1929-1938 – ILO (1934-38), except for values for Canada (Ostry and Zaidi 1972), the U.S. (Jones 1963, Owen 1988), 
and for Australia (Butlin 1977); 1950-1980 – ILO (1950-1980), except for U.S (McGratten and Rogerson 2004), and Australia (Butlin 1977); 1980-2000 – ILO 
(2005), except for U.S (McGratten and Rogerson 2004), Canada (Heisz and LaRochelle-Côté 2003), and Denmark (Eurostat, various years).      27
 
TABLE 2   
 
Vacation and Holidays, 1870-2000 
 
         
   1870  1900  1938  1950  1980  1990  2000 
Belgium  18  21  30  28  34  34  33 
Denmark  13  14  27  27  30  35  37 
France  19  23  33  28  30  36  36 
Germany  13  18  31  29  29  35  42.5 
Ireland  14  20  33  20  28  28  30 
Italy  23  24  37  24  35  40  41.5 
Netherlands  4  5  21  24  33  35  37.5 
Spain  31  31  44    30  35  36 
Sweden  11  13  28  29  30  37  38 
Switzerland  13  18  33  25  28  28  33 
United Kingdom  14  20  30  24  28  30  32.5 
         
Australia  8  9  22  22  32  32  32 
Canada  8  9  22  22  25  25  24 
US  4  5  17  18  22  23  20 
         
Old World   16  19  32  26  30  34  36 
New World   7  8  20  21  26  27  25 
 
Sources: 1870 and 1900 – Huberman (2004); 1938 – ILO (1939); 1950 and 1980 – European Industrial 
Relations Review (1982), Green and Potepan (1988), Monthly Labor Review (1955); 1990 – ILO (1995); 







 Annual hours of work. 1870-2000 
 
   1870  1880  1890  1900  1913  1929  1938  1950  1960  1973  1980  1990  2000 
Belgium  3483  3344  3177  3064  2841  2229  2196  2404  2289  1851  1736  1699  1547 
Denmark  3434  3172  2933  2742  2731  2301  2203  2071  1929  1871  1693  1492  1473 
France  3168  3165  3119  3115  2933  2198  1760  2045  2025  1849  1696  1558  1443 
Germany  3284  3223  3108  3056  2723  2128  2187  2372  2144  1808  1696  1541  1463 
Ireland  3108  3017  2869  2795  2690  2182  2171  2437  2320  2103  1954  1992  1686 
Italy  3000  3008  3006  3014  2953  2153  2162  1951  2012  1825  1724  1674  1612 
Netherlands  3274  3194  3105  3037  2942  2233  2281  2156  2002  1709  2000  1414  1352 
Spain  2968  2876  2787  2710  2601  2342  2030  2052  2042  2124  1968  1832  1815 
Sweden  3436  3187  2937  2745  2745  2152  2131  2009  1902  1683  1523  1550  1645 
Switzerland  3195  3083  2925  2834  2704  2281  2085  2092  1952  1835  1721  1617  1597 
UK  2755  2740  2669  2656  2656  2257  2200  2112  2134  1919  1758  1698  1653 
                  
Australia  2792  2647  2501  2385  2214  2186  2109  2023  1945  1837  1815  1806  1797 
Canada  2845  2934  3017  3102  2868  2354  2212  2111  2014  1874  1825  1830  1825 
US  3096  3044  2983  2938  2900  2316  1756  2008  2033  1942  1853  1840  1878 
                   
Old World  3191  3092  2967  2888  2774  2223  2128  2155  2068  1871  1770  1642  1572 
New World  2911  2875  2834  2808  2661  2285  2026  2047  1997  1884  1831  1825  1833 
                  
World  3131  3045  2938  2871  2750  2230  2133  2132  2053  1874  1783  1682  1627 
s.d.  238.8   194.1  186.1    212.2  192.4  73.0  128.8  157.0  126.8  122.8  129.9  163.2  161.2 
 
  
Sources: 1870-1913 – Huberman (2004); 1929 and 1938 – Tables 1 and 2, with deductions for days absent; 1950-2000 – University of Groningen (2005).    29
 
 
TABLE 4   
 
Determinants of Hours of Work, 1870-1900 
            
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Full Manuf.  Full  Full  Full 
Full 
sample 
   sample only  sample  sample  sample  Old  World
-.106 -.070  -.123  -.106  -.106  -.091  Log wage 
(-76.44) (-17.19)  (-88.15)  (-76.30)  (-76.27)  (-27.40) 
-.068 -.068  -.077  -.068  -.068  -.057 
Female 
(-34.93) (-13.16)  (-37.31)  (-34.76)  (-34.76)  (-11.69) 
   .095       
New World 
   (58.56)       
     .073  .074  .027 
Dependency ratio 
     (4.48)  (4.47)  (0.92) 
     .115  .118  -.299  Proportion 
agriculture       (2.91)  (2.81)  (-4.15) 
       -.004  -.040 
Voter turnout 
       (-0.19)  (-1.60) 
Country dummies  yes yes  no  yes  yes  yes 
Year dummies  yes yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Occupation 
dummies  yes no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
3.79 3.85  3.84  3.65  3.65  4.09 
Constant 
(433.55) (160.98)  (673.73)  (147.32)  (147.04)  (60.42) 
R-square  0.49 0.35  0.42  0.50  0.50  0.62 
F-test  416 39  410  400  393  163 
N  20886 3267  20886  20796  20796  4392 
 
 
Notes: OLS estimates. t statistics in parentheses.  
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor (1900). Dependency ratio, defined as the number of males less than 16 years of 
age plus males over 65 plus all females divided by males between 16 and 65, is calculated from Lindert and Mitchell 
(1980); proportion of population in agriculture from Flora (1983), Lindert (2004), and Mitchell (1980); voter turnout 
from Flora (1983) and Lindert (2004). 




 Hours Regressions by Country: 1870-1900 
         
   Log wage  Log wage gap R-square  F-test  N 
-.058 (-3.03)     .09  9.2  93  Australia 
-.037 (-2.10)  -.011 (-4.64)  .25  14.8  92 
-.089 (-4.85)    .13  23.5  158  Belgium 
-.085 (-4.44)  -.005 (-1.85)  .14  12.2  155 
-.018 (-2.56)    .01  6.6  452  Canada 
-.020 (-2.80)  .006 (2.18)  .02  5.7  452 
-.165 (-7.53)    .59  56.6  42  Denmark 
-.122 (-4.98)  -.032 (-3.61)  .70  43.3  41 
-.063 (-10.06)    .15  101  583  France 
-.063 (-9.89)  -.002 (-0.55)  .15  50.7  583 
-.112 (-15.67)    .32  246  524  Germany 
-.111 (-15.47)  -.003 (-1.28)  .32  124  524 
-.044 (-4.47)    .07  20.0  268  Ireland 
-.056 (-4.73)  .005 (2.20)  .09  12.4  253 
-.058 (-7.24)    .17  52.4  261  Italy 
-.046 (-5.68)  -.012 (-4.54)  .22  38.5  261 
-.031 (-1.72)    .02  3.0  140  Netherlands 
-.034 (-1.87)  .003 (1.20)  .03  2.2  140 
-.102 (-3.53)    .15  12.5  75  Spain 
-.099 (-3.39)  -.008 (-1.07)  .16  6.7  74 
.018 (0.76)    .03  0.6  21  Sweden 
.015 (0.61)  .002 (0.52)  .04  0.4  21 
-.076 (-9.27)    .46  86.0  103  Switzerland 
-.076 (-8.32)  .003 (1.90)  .42  34.8  99 
-.087 (-22.56)    .18  509  2311  United Kingdom 
-.087 (-22.70)  -.007 (-2.77)  .18  259  2311 
-.094 (-82.05)    .30  6752  15859  United States 
-.096 (-79.13)  .008 (4.22)  .30  3379  15859 
 
Notes: OLS estimates. t statistics in parentheses. Inequality is calculated as the difference between maximum and 
minimum wages for each year. These regressions include dummies for occupation and sex.   31
 
 
TABLE 6   
 
Determinants of Hours of Work, 1970-2000 
         
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  Full Comparable Mfg.  Comparable  Comparable Comparable
  sample  industries  only  industries industries industries 
.015 -.056  -.035  -.120 -.059 -.056  Log wage 
(2.95) (-6.49)  (-3.78)  (-16.75)  (-6.82) (-6.49) 
-.136 -.160  -.116  -.174 -.161 -.160  Female 
(-41.12) (-37.23)  (-26.33)  (-36.72) (-37.40) (-37.30) 
-.032 -.015  -.023  -.043 -.014 -.015  Male and Female 
(-10.32) (-4.23) (-8.25) (-12.20) (-4.07)  (-4.27) 
     -.002     New World 
     (-0.05)    
      .022  .020  Dependency ratio 
      (0.80)  (0.73) 
      -.200  -.150  Proportion 
agriculture        (-2.47)  (-2.17) 
       .001  Union density 
       (3.55) 
Country dummies  yes yes  yes no  yes yes 
Year dummies  yes yes  yes  yes yes yes 
Occupation 
dummies  yes yes  yes  yes yes yes 
R-square  0.62 0.61  0.73  0.45 0.61 0.61 
N  4840 2277  950 2277 2277 2277 
 
 
Notes: OLS estimates. t statistics in parentheses. 
Sources: ILO (2005); proportion agriculture from Mitchell (1980) and OECD (2004); dependency ratio from OECD (2004); 
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square F-test  N 
.018 .002 0.7  474  .009 .002  0.7  477  Australia 
(0.84)       (0.85)      
-.076 .30  2.9 9 -.054  .34 3.6 9  Belgium 
(-1.71)       (-1.89)      
.067 .004 0.1  15 .040  .08 1.1  15  France 
(0.22)       (1.04)      
-.080 .29 19.5  49  -.147 .53  109  100  Germany 
(-4.41)       (-10.44)      
-.120 .02 1.9  81  -.025 .02 2.3  109  Ireland 
(-1.39)       (-1.52)      
-.258 .29 59.7  146  -.141 .27  76.6  211  Netherlands 
(-7.73)       (-8.75)      
.123 .04 6.4  143  .046 .07  12.4  165  Sweden 
(2.53)       (3.53)      
-.115  .05  0.5 12 -.155  .001 0.7 21  Switzerland 
(-0.71)       (-0.37)      
-.099 .22 70.6  255  -.163 .32  151  317  United 
Kingdom  (-8.40)           (-12.27)          
 





































Table 1)  42.5 39.4  40.4 38.9 38.7 39.4 39.2 42.9 
Actual gap    3.1    1.5    -0.7    -3 
Predicted hours, 
regression  1  43.4 42.3  42.6 41.6 42.2 41.7  42  41.4 
Predicted  gap    1.1    1    0.5    0.6 
Predicted hours, 
regression  2  38.1  36.7  37.5  36.4 37 36.5  36.9  36.1 
Predicted  gap  1.4   1.1  0.5  0.8 
 
Notes: In regression 1, hours for 1870-1900 were regressed against log wages and a dummy for sex; regression 2 
adds dependency ratios and the proportion of the population in agriculture. The coefficients from this regression 
were combined with actual average values for Old and New Worlds between 1970 and 1990 to predict hours in 
recent decades. 
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TABLE 9 
Regression Results of Hours of Work on Deep Variables, 1950-2000 
 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  1950- 1950- 1950- 1950- 1950- 1970- 1970- 1970- 
  2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
  Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Weekly Weekly Weekly 
   hours hours hours hours hours hours hours hours 
-.111 -.138 -.087 -.097 -.164        Log GDP per capita 
(-10.62) (-13.66)  (-5.23)  (-5.97)  (-6.73)       
      -.059  -.066  -.077  Log wage 
      (-8.01)  (-8.15)  (-9.10) 
  .061         New World 
  (10.03)        
   .127  .124  .248  .196  Dependency ratio 
   (4.56)  (4.53)  (14.54)   (8.10) 
   -.082  -.065  -.023  -.069  Union density*100 
   (-5.64)  (-4.03)  (-2.62)  (-6.49) 
   .002  .001  -.003  -.002  % Unemployment 
   (1.78)  (0.67)  (-6.30)  (-3.18) 
    -.057  -0.016    .062  .078  % Protestant, 1870 
    (-6.60)  (-1.49)    (9.09)  (8.38) 
    .002  .001    -.018  -.007  Primary enrolment, 1870 
    (0.55)  (2.10)    (-7.86)  (-2.01) 
    .011  0.015    -.011  -.007  Log urban area per capita, 
1870      (4.15)  (5.70)    (-7.06)  (-4.17) 
Sex dummies        Y  Y  Y 
Year dummies  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
8.65 8.88 8.96 8.61 9.09 3.55 3.83 3.60  Constant 
(91.15) (97.18)  (110.68)  (62.64) (40.06)  (117.18)  (159.84)  (79.93) 
R-square  .68 .73 .66 .71 .77 .45 .43 .47 
F-test  28 34  455  29 31 50 46 50 
N  714 714 587 714 587  2168  2241  2168 
 
Notes: OLS estimates. t statistics in parentheses. Sources: For deep variables, see text and Figures 6-7, 9-10.    35
FIGURE 1 
Hours of Work per Week 
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FIGURE 2
Annual Hours of Work 























































Notes and sources: The vertical axis is annual hours. GDP is in 1990 international U.S. dollars from University of 
Groningen (2005).     38
 
FIGURE 4
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Sources: The vertical axis is percentage increase in voters, 1870-1913. Voter turnout from Flora (1983) and Lindert 
(2004). 
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FIGURE 5
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Notes and source: The vertical axis is the annual percentage change in inequality, 1870-1913. Inequality index from 
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Notes and Source: The vertical axis is percent Protestant in 1880. Lindert (2004).    41
FIGURE 7
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Notes and source: The vertical axis is the enrolment rate in 1880. Enrolment is primary-school students per 1000 















déco p esseu ( )
sont requis pour visionner cette image
déco p esseu ( )









   43
FIGURE 9 
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Notes and sources: The vertical axis is urban area per capita in 2000 (x100). Urban area per capita = ((area in sq km 
x urban extent)/population). All values are for 2000. Population is from University of Groningen (2005). Area and 
urban extent from Centre for International Earth Science Information Network:  
http://beta.sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/gpw/global.jsp#summary. Commuting-time estimates for 2000 from:   
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Notes and sources: The vertical axis is urban area per capita in 1870 (x100). Values for area and urban extent are for 
2000. See Figure 9.  Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland